

## Message Text

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ACTION AF-06

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02

INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15

USIA-06 IO-10 AID-05 EB-07 AGR-05 COME-00 CU-02 OMB-01

TRSE-00 /095 W

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R 070450Z OCT 75

FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9705

INFO AMEMBASSY KINSHASA

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY LUSAKA

AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO

AMEMBASSY NAIROBI

AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE

AMCONSUL ZANZIBAR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 DAR ES SALAAM 4581

E.O.11652: GDS

TAGS: PINT, ECON, PFOR, OGEN, TZ

SUBJECT: ZANZIBAR, RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT: AND END-OF-TOUR  
ASSESSMENT

1. PRINCIPAL OFFICER LEWIS R. MACFARLANE, CURRENTLY IN DAR ES SALAAM, HAS CONCLUDED A TWO-YEAR ASSIGNMENT AS PRINCIPAL OFFICER IN ZANZIBAR. FOLLOWING ARE HIS OBSERVATIONS AND COMMENTS ON POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN THE CONSULAR DISTRICT AND HIS VIEWS ON FUTURE TRENDS.

2. POLITICAL DYNAMICS AND PERSONALITIES. ABOUD JUMBE'S POSITION AS PARTY AND GOVERNMENT LEADER IS DOMINANT BUT NOT UNASSAILABLE. HE STILL MUST ACHIEVE A WORKING CONSENSUS FROM DISPARATE ELEMENTS RANGING FROM TRADITION ORIENTED OLD SHIRAZIS TO YOUNGER RADICAL ELEMENTS. HE HAS NONETHELESS WORKED WITH SOME SUCCESS TO PUT HIS OWN STAMP ON GOVERNMENT/PARTY FUNCTIONS, A PROCESS  
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BEGUN AT THE LAST PARTY CONGRESS IN 1972 AND VERY LIKELY TO BE

CONSOLIDATED AT THE UPCOMING ONE. ONE STRONG LIKELIHOOD IS A GOVERNMENT RESHUFFLE, MOVING OUT AT LEAST SOME REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL DEADWOOD, TOGETHER WITH ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES FURTHER DOWNGRADING THE REVCO AND STRENGTHENING THE NEWER PARTY ORGANS THROUGH WHICH JUMBE PREFERS TO WORK. WE CAN EXPECT FURTHER EFFORTS TO RATIONALIZE AND TIGHTEN UP PARTY/GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, ABOUT WHICH THERE IS STILL MUCH JUSTIFIED DISSATISFACTION. THERE MAY ALSO BE EFFORTS TO FORMALLY REMOLD GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION: ZANZIBAR'S TWELVE DEPARTMENTS (MINISTRIES), ADDED TO THE PLETHORA OF AD HOC COMMITTEES AND PARTY BODIES, CONSTITUTE AN UNWIELDLY MIX. BUT THE GOZ REMAINS IN ESSENCE JUMBE PLUS A HANDFUL OF OTHER MEN -- SOME COMPETENT, SOME NOT -- WHO WEAR MULTIPLE HATS AND DEAL WITH THE WHOLE RANGE OF OFFICIAL MATTERS. UNTIL SOME OF THE TOP PLAYERS CHANGE, RELATIVELY LITTLE WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED BY TINKERING WITH THE MACHINERY.

3. JUMBE PERSONALLY IS FRUSTRATED BY THE SLOW PACE OF DEVELOPMENT, THE INABILITY OF SUBORDINATES EFFECTIVELY TO CARRY OUT DELEGATED RESPONSIBILITIES, AND THE CONTINUED FAILURE OF THE SYSTEM TO DELIVER AS HE BELIEVES IT SHOULD. THIS ACCOUNTS FOR THE FRANTIC PACE WHICH HE SETS FOR HIMSELF AND THOSE AROUND HIM. HE IS CLEARLY THE MOST ABLE MAN ON THE SCENE OR IN THE WINGS AND HIS PERSONAL FUTURE MERITS SPECULATION. WHILE CURRENTLY ABLE TO SUSTAIN A TOUGH, DEMANDING

SCHEDULE WITH APPARENT RELISH, HE NONETHELESS HAS LATENT HEALTH PROBLEMS WHICH COULD TAKE HIM FROM THE SCENE. SO COULD A RECASTING OF MAINLAND POLITICS IF, AS WE BELIEVE POSSIBLE, NYERERE MIGHT DECIDE TO STEP DOWN FROM THE PRESIDENCY AND DEVOTE HIMSELF STRICTLY TO PARTY MATTERS. SHOULD THIS OCCUR, JUMBE (WHO AS FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT HAS APPARENTLY MADE A CONSCIOUS AND AT LEAST PARTLY SUCCESSFUL EFFORT TO CREATE A MAINLAND FOLLOWING OF HIS OWN) WOULD BE A GOOD POSSIBILITY TO SUCCEED NYERERE, NOTWITHSTANDING HIS ISLAND ORIGINS.

4. WHAT SORT OF LEADERSHIP WOULD EMERGE ON THE ISLAND IF JUMBE DEPARTED FROM THE SCENE? CONTINUITY MIGHT BE REFLECTED IN THE SUCCESSION OF MINISTER OF STATE HASSAN NASSOR MOYO. PERHAPS EQUALLY LIKELY, THOUGH, WOULD BE AN EFFORT BY MILITARY/SECURITY/YOUTH LEAGUE ELEMENTS -- HEADED IN FACT BY COLONEL SEIF BAKARI AND CURRENTLY CONFIDENTIAL

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OCCUPYING A STRONG BUT SUBORDINATE POSITION -- TO MOVE FOR EFFECTIVE CONTROL IN ISLAND AFFAIRS. THIS WOULD PROBABLY REVERSE CURRENT TRENDS TOWARD MORE MODERATE AND PRAGMATIC POLICIES.

5. WHAT I DO NOT FORESEE IS ANY MOVE TOWARD INTERNALLY MORE REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT. GROUPS ON JUMBE'S LEFT AND RIGHT

WOULD OPPOSE SUCH A MOVE, AND JUMBE HIMSELF, MUCH MORE MODERATE AND RATIONAL IN APPROACH THAN KARUME, SEEMS NO MORE OF A DEMOCRAT THAN HIS PREDECESSOR.

6. ECONOMY AND SOCIETY. ZANZIBAR'S ECONOMIC FUTURE IS NOT BLEAK, BUT QUESTIONS ABOUND. FOR THE SHORT TERM, ZANZIBAR REMAINS IN A FAIRLY STRONG POSITION DUE TO ITS CONTINUING DOMINANCE OF WORLD CLOVE PRODUCTION AND PRICES. HOWEVER, WITH THE CLOVE ECONOMY IN A SLOW BUT ALMOST CERTAINLY IRREVERSIBLE DECLINE, JUMBE HAS CLEARLY PERCEIVED THE NEED TO DEVELOP AND BROADEN THE CASH ECONOMY AND TO REDUCE DEPENDENCE ON IMPORTS. BUT ZANZIBAR HAS ONLY A LITTLE OVER 1,000 SQUARE MILES, MUCH OF IT INFERTILE, TO PLAY WITH, AND THERE ARE THUS REAL RISKS IN THIS PROCESS. SOME EFFORTS TO RECAST THE AGRICULTURAL ECONOMY HAVE PROVED ILL-CONCEIVED, OTHERS HAVE BEEN POORLY EXECUTED, AND IT IS CLEAR THAT THE GOZ ON ITS OWN CANNOT DO THEJOB. IT IS PROBABLY FOR THIS REASON THAT ZANZIBAR HAS SOUGHT TO DIVERSIFY ITS SOURCE OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, WITH SPECIAL STRESS ON AGRICULTURE. SIMILARLY, ZANZIBAR HAS SOUGHT TO BREAK OUT OF OLD TRADE RELATIONS AND TO SEEK BROADER COMMERCIAL TIES. THIS SEEMS LIKELY TO CONTINUE.

7. RELATED TO THE STRONG ECONOMIC PROBELMS WHICH ZANZIBAR FACES IS A CONTINUING AND SERIOUS LACK OF TRAINED MANPOWER IN ALL AREAS. THE PROBLEM IS RECOGNIZED BUT THUS FAR PROGRAMS TO CORRECT IT ARE CLEARLY INADEQUATE. ZANZIBAR CONTINUES TO CRANK OUT QUANTITIES OF SECONDARY SCHOOL-LEAVERS BUT TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES FOR FUTURE EDUCATION, EITHER ON THE ISLAND OR ABROAD, ARE SHARPLY LIMITED; MATCHING OF MEN TO JOBS IS STILL HAPHAZARD; AND NEPOTISM AND POLITICAL FAVORITISM STILL PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE.

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INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02

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R 070450Z OCT 75

FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9706  
INFO AMEMBASSY KINSHASA  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
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AMEMBASSY NAIROBI  
AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE  
AMCONSUL ZANZIBAR

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8. JUMBE PERSONALLY HAS SOUGHT TO RATIONALIZE THE DEVELOPMENT PLANNING PROCESS BUT IT IS STILL A VERY SLOW, DISJOINTED, AND AD HOC EFFORT. GIVEN FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS THAT STILL EXIST, IT IS NOT CLEAR THAT THE GOZ WILL BE ABLE TO MOVE QUICKLY AND EFFECTIVELY ENOUGH TOWARD NEW GOALS WITHOUT RISKING SERIOUS ECONOMIC, AND THUS POLITICAL, DISLOCATIONS.

9. FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNION. WITH REGARD TO MOST WORLD AND AFRICAN ISSUES, TANGOV AND GOZ SPEAK WITH A SINGLE VOICE. ON THE BIG QUESTIONS, WHICH MUCH OF TANZANIA'S FOREIGN POLICY SEEKS TO ADDRESS, JUMBE IS CLOSER IDEOLOGICALLY AND TEMPERAMENTALLY TO NYERERE THAN WAS KARUME, AND HE IS THUS ABLE TO SERVE AS AN ACTIVE AND PERSUASIVE TANZANIAN SPOKESMAN IN A WAY HIS PREDECESSOR NEVER COULD. BUT ZANZIBAR, ON "BILATERAL" ISSUES THAT IT PERCEIVES AS CONCERNING IT BUT NOT THE MAINLAND PURSUES WHAT IS BEST DESCRIBED AS A SEPARATE FOREIGN POLICY. THE ZANZIBARI-STAFFED "ASP DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS" NOT ONLY COORDINATES RELATIONS WITH THE MAINLAND  
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BUT ALSO FACILITATES THROUGH GOZ CONTACTS WITH OTHER STATES IN AFRICA AND ELSEWHERE, NOTABLY KENYA AND UGANDA, AND WITH THE EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY BODIES. ONE OF THE OBVIOUS ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF UNION FOR ZANZIBAR IS SHARING A JOINTLY-RUN FOREIGN POLICY OPERATION, BUT THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT ZANZIBAR WILL NOT CONTINUE TO PURSUE ITS OWN OBJECTIVES ABROAD IF AND AS IT SEES FIT.

10. WHEN JUMBE TOOK OVER FROM ABEID KARUME IN APRIL 1972, IT WAS SPECULATED THAT THE LONG-FALTERING UNION RELATIONSHIP MIGHT FINALLY BEING TO DEVELOP AND CONSOLIDATE MEANINGFULLY, PARTICULARLY AS THE AFFINITY OF ABOUD JUMBE FOR A MORE MODERN, RESPONSIVE STYLE OF LEADERSHIP AND HIS CLOSE PERSONAL TIES WITH PRESIDENT NYERERE BECAME MORE APPARENT IN THE MONTHS FOLLOWING KARUME'S ASSASSINATION. A CLOSE LOOK OVER THE PAST THREE AND ONE-HALF YEARS, HOWEVER, FAILS TO REVEAL EVIDENCE THAT CLOSER UNION EITHER HAS OCCURRED OR IS ABOUT TO. NOTWITHSTANDING ASP-TANU PARTY EXCHANGES AND VISITS AND SOME INFORMAL COORDINATION ON TECHNICAL MATTERS, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO POINT TO ANY NEW INSTITUTIONAL TIES OF ANY IMPORTANCE.

11. ECONOMICALLY, THE TWO ENTITIES REMAIN FOR ALL INTENTS AND PURPOSES SEPARATE; THE MAINLAND'S ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES PROBABLY HAVE INTENSIFIED ZANZIBAR'S DETERMINATION TO REMAIN SO. THERE HAS BEEN NO PROGRESS IN POOLING FOREIGN RESERVE HOLDINGS. ECONOMIC PLANNING AND TRADE REMAIN SEPARATE FUNCTIONS AND -- WITH THE EXCEPTION OF LIMITED UNION MATTERS -- SO DOES BUDGETING. A RECENT ISSUE HAS ARISEN OVER ZANZIBAR'S DESIRE TO SECURE MORE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, AND THIS HAS RESULTED IN A BEHIND-THE-SCENES DISPUTE, WITH THE GOZ ARGUING THAT SINCE ASSISTANCE IS A UNION MATTER, PROSPECTIVE AID DONORS MUST BE APPROACHED JOINTLY AND THAT ZANZIBAR RECEIVE A FAIR (KIF NOT NECESSARILY EQUAL) SHARE OF BILATERAL ASSISTANCE. WHILE TANGOV HAS NOW SEEMINGLY ACCEPTED THIS POINT OF VIEW, FOREIGN ASSISTANCE IS MORE LIKELY TO REMAIN A SOURCE OF DISAGREEMENT RATHER THAN COMMON PURPOSE.

12. IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE ANYTHING ON THE HORIZON LIKELY TO PROMOTE A SIGNIFICANTLY CLOSER UNION RELATIONSHIP -- AND THIS INCLUDES THE RECENT CALL BY PRESIDENT NYERERE FOR A MERGER OF TANU AND THE ASP. WHILE SUPPORT HAS QUICKLY BEEN GENERATED ON THE MAINLAND FOR THE MOVE, IT WILL TAKE MUCH MORE THAN TANU ENTHUSIASM TO SIMILARLY SELL ZANZIBAR PARTY AND GOVERN-  
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MENT LEADERS ON THE IDEA. THEY CONCEIVE THE UNION AS A LIMITED ALLIANCE, ORIGINALLY AND STILL ESTABLISHED FOR STRICTLY LIMITED PURPOSES AND FOR THE MUTUAL ADVANTAGE OF TWO WIDELY, IF NOT FUNDAMENTALLY, DISSIMILAR SOCIETIES. THEY ARE NOT ABOUT TO GO FURTHER UNLESS PERSUADED THAT A PARTY MERGER WILL LEAVE UNTOUCHED ZANZIBAR'S INTERNAL CONTROL OVER ITS OWN ECONOMY, GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY.

13. THE PROCLAIMED MOVE OF TANZANIA'S NATIONAL CAPITAL FROM DAR ES SALLAM TO DODOMA, ALTHOUGH STILL TEN YEARS AWAY, INTRODUCED AN ADDITIONAL STRAIN INTO THE UNION RELATIONSHIP WHEN IT WAS ANNOUNCED

(JUMBE AND HIS COLLEAGUES WERE NOT CONSULTED BEFOREHAND) AND WCYL CONTINUE TO DO SO FOR BOTH SYMBOLIC AND GEOGRAPHIC REASON.

ON A RECENT OCCASION, IN THE COURSE OF A CONVERSATION ABOUT THE POSSIBLE CLOSURE OF FOREIGN CONSULATES ON THE ISLAND, A RANKING ZANZIBAR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OFFICIAL REMARKED, "CLOSE CONSULATES? IF THE MOVE ACTUALLY TAKES PLACE, YOU MAY BE ALL OPENING EMBASSIES HERE AGAIN." THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE COMOROS, SEYCHELLES AND OTHER MISCELLANEOUS ISLANDS HAS LEAD TO A SPATE OF TALK -- MUCH OF IT UNDOUBTEDLY LOOSE AND IDLE -- THAT ZANZIBAR, ONCE INDEPENDENT, MAY BE SO AGAIN. I SEE NO SIGN THAT SUCH A MOVE IS IN THE OFFING, BUT IT MUST BE BORNE IN MIND WHEN CONTEMPLATING ZANZIBAR'S FUTURE.  
CARTER

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## Message Attributes

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